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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. May the Plaintiff/Appellant claim reversible error based 
upon her assertion that the Findings of Fact which she drafted for 
the court's signature are inadequate? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its judicial and statutory 
discretion in not making its increased child support award 
retroactive? 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant/Respondent, Dr. Brown, seeks affirmance of the 
trial court's Order on plaintiff's Petition for Modification and 
on defendant's Counter Petition for Modification in all respects 
and for an award of costs incurred by him in connection with 
responding to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter involves a divorce action. The Decree was entered 
in February 1980. In March of 1983, Mrs. Brown filed a Petition 
to Modify the Decree seeking increases in alimony and child 
support. Dr. Brown counter-petitioned seeking a termination of the 
original alimony award. The Petitions were set for trial in August 
1984. A settlement of the issues was agreed to by the parties in 
June of 1984 at a deposition prior to trial. Five months later, 
Mrs. Brown elected not to comply with the agreement and Dr. Brown 
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sought to enforce it. The trial court, after a hearing, elected 
to enforce it. Mrs. Brown appealed that decision. This Court, in 
the case of Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987) (a copy 
of which is included in the Addendum to this Brief) reversed the 
trial court and set aside the settlement agreement and directed 
that a trial be held in connection with both Petitions. In 
October, 1988, that trial was held. In a Memorandum Decision, the 
trial court, among other things, increased the original child 
support award and did not make the increased award retroactive and 
did not grant Dr. Brown's request to terminate alimony. At the 
direction of the Court, Mrs. Brown's counsel prepared Findings, 
Conclusions and an Order which were approved by Dr. Brown's counsel 
(A copy has been included in the Addendum to this Brief) . No post 
trial motions were filed by either side. Mrs. Brown has now 
appealed the issue of retroactive application of child support only 
to this Court. Dr. Brown has not cross-appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Brown's brief does not contain a Statement of Facts as 
is required by Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, in order for this Court to have the facts before it 
sufficient to address the issue raised by Mrs. Brown, Dr. Brown 
submits the following Statement of Facts related to the original 
divorce action, the subsequent modification and the appeals which 
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have followed. 
Dr. and Mrs. Brown were married for ten years (R. 11) . At the 
time of the divorce, they had three children ages 9, 6 & 3 (R. 12) . 
Mrs. Brown was awarded custody of the children (R. 19) . The 
original Decree of Divorce required Dr. Brown to pay $900.00 per 
month alimony terminating upon the appellant's remarriage or 
cohabitation (R. 21) . Dr. Brown also was ordered to pay child 
support of $300.00 per month, per child until each child reached 
age 18 or married. If any of the children chose to attend college 
or serve on an LDS mission, child support for that child would 
continue until age 21 (R. 20-21). 
At all time material to this action, Dr. Brown has made all 
required alimony and child support payments in a timely manner (Tr. 
133-134). 
In March 1983, Mrs. Brown sought modification of the original 
Decree seeking in part increased alimony to $1,500.00 per month and 
increased child support to $500.00 per month, per child (R. 29). 
Respondent counter-petitioned seeking an expansion of his 
visitation and termination of alimony (R. 37). The parties began 
preparing for trial on the modification issues by conducting 
extensive discovery. A final trial date was set for August 14, 
1984 (R. 148). Respondent had scheduled appellant's deposition for 
June 4, 1984. Just prior to that time, the parties had exchanged 
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proposals for settlement. At the deposition, they agreed to a 
settlement of all issues and put the Settlement Agreement on the 
record with the understanding that it would later be reduced to 
writing. Counsel for respondent then reduced the Agreement to 
writing and was sent it to appellant's counsel for signature. 
Based upon that, the August trial date was stricken. Beginning 
immediately in July, Dr. Brown began to make the increased payments 
to Mrs. Brown as required was required by the Stipulation that he 
assumed was binding upon him. Mrs. Brown accepted these payments 
without comment, however, five months after her counsel withdrew, 
she communicated to her new attorney that she did not feel bound 
by the Stipulation. Respondent thereafter filed a Motion and was 
granted an order enforcing the June 4, Settlement Agreement (R. 
160-165, 191-198). 
Mrs. Brown appealed that decision to the Utah Supreme Court 
in August 1985. This case was subsequently transferred to this 
Court. In October of 1987, this Court issued its opinion 
determining that the June 1984 Stipulation was invalid and remanded 
the entire back to the trial court for a full hearing on both 
Petitions (See Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987). 
A one-day trial, was conducted on October 18, 1988. 
Documentary evidence and testimony was presented by both sides in 
support of their respective Petitions. 
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Dr. Brown testified that he had faithfully paid his child 
support and alimony as was required by several different agreements 
he presumed were binding on him over the course of almost nine 
years the parties had been divorced (Tr. 134) . At the time of 
trial, he had paid $95,400.00 in alimony over nine years (Tr. 132) . 
He also had paid the increased child support called for under the 
June 1984, stipulation, for the first five months of increased 
support until Mrs. Brown stated she would not abide by the 
Agreement (Tr. 117). 
In addition, for 11 months during 1987, the parties1 oldest 
daughter, Charisse, lived with Dr. Brown in his home (Tr. 134) . 
For the first eight months of that time he continued to pay full 
child support to Mrs. Brown. After eight months, a Stipulation was 
entered into allowing Dr. Brown to pay half of the support for 
Charisse while she resided with him (Tr. 116). 
At the time of trial, Dr. Brown had remarried and had two 
additional children from that marriage (Tr. 13). In addition, he 
was working 80-90 hours per week to maintain the income level which 
was presented to the Court (Tr. 129). 
After both sides had presented their evidence, the trial court 
took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued its 
Memorandum Decision. In that decision, the trail court found that 
Mrs. Brown's income had increased from zero to $14,000.00 annually 
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and Dr. Brown's income had increased from $70,000.00 per year to 
$100,000.00 plus per year (R. 370-371). Based upon that change of 
circumstances, it ordered the following: 
(a) The defendant was to continue to pay the 
$900.00 per month alimony award until such time 
as the youngest child of the parties reached 
the age of majority. 
(b) It increased the defendant's child support 
obligation from $300.00 per month to $500.00 
per month per child keeping the original 
provision in the Decree that child support 
would continue to the age of 21 years if that 
child elected to serve a mission for the LDS 
Church or attend a college or university. 
(c) It denied plaintiff's request that the 
increased child support award be made 
retroactive to the date of the filing of her 
Petition for Modification. 
(d) It awarded Mrs. Brown $5,000.00 toward her 
attorney's fees. 
(e) It gave Dr. Brown six weeks summer 
visitation with the children. 
(R. 370-373) 
The trial court then directed Mrs. Brown's counsel to prepare 
appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of 
Modification reflecting the decision of the Court (R. 373). The 
Findings so prepared by Mrs. Brown's counsel were approved by Dr. 
Brown's counsel (R. 391). Neither side filed any post-trial 
motions. Mrs. Brown then filed a timely Notice of Appeal appealing 
only the trial court's decision not to make the increased child 
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support award retroactive (R. 393) . Dr. Brown did not file a 
cross-appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
Mrs. Brown claims that the Findings of Fact signed by the 
trial court were inadequate and the matter should be remanded for 
entry of additional Findings. Mrs. Brown's counsel prepared those 
Findings of Fact and, consequently, she cannot now attempt to seek 
a reversal on the grounds that those Findings are inadequate. 
Under this Court's holding of Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah 
App. 1987) and the Utah Supreme Court's holding of Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
POINT II 
The trial court's decision not to make the increased child 
support award retroactive to the date Mrs. Brown's Petition for 
Modification was filed was a matter within the sound discretion 
afforded the trial court. That discretion as it relates to this 
particular issue is supported not only by judicial authority as 
established by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals, but also statutorily as established by the Utah State 
Legislature. 
Further, the statute upon which Mrs. Brown relies, 
not only makes retroactive application of increased support awards 
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discretionary with the Court, but also was not enacted until April 
of 1987, and, therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply the 
provisions of that statute related to retroactive application to 
the facts of this case, 
POINT III 
Evidence on the issue of retroactive application of increased 
child support was presented to the trial court by both sides. 
Likewise, each side presented legal arguments and legal memorandum 
related to that request. The trial court considered that evidence 
as well as those legal arguments in connection with fashioning an 
overall remedy which would be fair to both parties under the 
circumstances of this particular case. Any attempt to adjust or 
change one particular aspect of the trial court"s decision when 
that decision was based upon numerous factors, all of which are 
interrelated, would require adjustment of all the others in order 
to maintain an equitable result. Mrs. Brown has not shown that the 




BECAUSE MRS. BROWN PREPARED THE FINAL 
FINDINGS AND ORDER FROM WHICH SHE IS 
NOW APPEALING, SHE IS PRECLUDED FROM 
NOW CLAIMING THAT THOSE FINDINGS ON 
THE ISSUE OF THE RETROACTIVITY OF THE 
INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT AWARD ARE 
INADEQUATE. 
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In Point I of her brief, Mrs. Brown claims that the trial 
court committed reversible error because it failed to make a 
specific finding on her request that any increased child support 
award be made retroactive. This claim of error is without merit 
and should be denied. First, the issue of retroactive application 
of any increased child support award was requested in Mrs. Brown's 
original Petition to Modify (R. 29) and was thoroughly briefed by 
both Mrs. and Dr. Brown at the time of trial (R. 352-369, 374-385). 
Likewise, substantial evidence was presented by both sides 
regarding the overall fairness of granting or not granting Mrs. 
Brown's request for retroactive application and both parties' 
counsel argued their respective positions on that issue to the 
trial court during closing arguments (Tr. Vol. 2, pgs. 4, 5, 9, 
10) . 
Following all of that, the trial court then filed a Memorandum 
Decision, paragraph 3 of which stated: 
Plaintiff's petition for increased child 
support retroactive to the date of filing her 
petition is denied. . . . Plaintiff's counsel 
is requested to prepare and submit the 
appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Otder of Modification as indicated 
above. (R. 372) 
While Point I of Appellant's Brief cites various facts, 
figures and calculations which attempt to support her claim of 
inadequate Findings, those facts and figure become immaterial to 
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the basic issue which has been raised on appeal — were the 
Findings adequate and, if not, can the person who prepared the 
Findings rely on any claimed inadequacies in an attempt to reverse 
a trial court's decision? 
Mrs. Brown's counsel was directed to prepare appropriate 
Findings and Conclusions and an Order. Mrs. Brown did not request 
additional Findings, did not make a motion for new trial or did not 
seek clarification from the trial court relative to its denial of 
retroactive application. Rather, Mrs. Brown's counsel prepared the 
Findings from which she now seeks relief. 
Under Utah law, when a party prepares Findings for signature 
by the Court, that party cannot afterwards claim reversible error 
based upon a claim of inadequacy of the Findings so prepared. That 
law is clearly and succinctly set forth in the recent decision of 
this Court in the case of Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 
1987) . Judge Greenwood, writing for a unanimous panel, cited with 
approval the Utah Supreme Court case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985), and stated: 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), 
appellant claimed that the trial court had 
improperly distributed property. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated that findings of fact must 
include valuation of assets in order to commit 
appellate review. In Jones, as here, counsel 
for the parties seeking such review had 
prepared the findings of fact, conclusion of 
law and decree of divorce and had not included, 
or attempted to include, values in those 
pleadings. The Supreme Court declined to 
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disturb the property distribution, stating that 
such claim had been waived because the party 
seeking reversal failed to attempt to include 
property values in the findings of fact. Jones 
at 1074-75. We agree that the failure to 
include property valuations in divorce may, in 
some cases, constitute an abuse of discretion 
sufficient to require remand for determination 
of values. However, when the lack of valuation 
results from the complaining parties1 own 
draftsmanship and no clear abuse of discretion 
is otherwise proven, we will defer to the trial 
court's property distribution. Those factors 
exist in the case before us and we therefore 
affirm as to property and debt division. 
Id. at 671 
As Justice Zimmerman further elaborated in Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985): 
Normally, we would grant the remedy sought 
by the wife and remand for findings on the 
specific values of the assets. In this case, 
however, the wife's attorney prepared the 
inadequate findings of fact she challenges on 
appeal and the conclusions of law and decree 
of divorce, all of which the court entered 
without alteration. Counsel for the wife made 
no motion to have the trial court amend the 
findings to conclude values. See URCP 52(b). 
The wife cannot come now, albeit through new 
counsel, and complains of her own failure to 
include specific property values in the 
findings of fact. She has waived that claim. 
Id. at 1074-1075. 
Unlike the facts in Jones, Mrs. Brown's trial counsel who 
prepared the Findings and Order is also her counsel in connection 
with her appeal. Mrs. Brown did not make a motion for new trial, 
nor make any motion to have the trial court amend the Memorandum, 
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Decision or Findings to address in more detail the retroactive 
application issue. As such, Mrs. Brown is now precluded from 
claiming that the Findings of the trial court on the issue of 
retroactive application of child support are inadequate. Point I 
of Mrs. Brown's brief is without merit. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT IN A DIVORCE 
ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE IS 
A CLEAR SHOWING OF A MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW 
OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION RESULTING IN A 
SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR A SERIOUS INEQUITY. 
Mrs. Brown contends that the trial court erred in not making 
the increased child support award retroactive to the date her 
Petition to Modify was filed and, consequently, abused the wide 
discretion afforded it in deciding support issues in divorce 
actions. She is incorrect in making that claim. 
In order to prevail on this appeal, Mrs. Brown is required to 
show that the trial court, in dealing with her request for 
retroactive application, misunderstood or misapplied the law, 
entered findings not supported by the evidence, or caused a serious 
inequity so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See also 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977); Davis v. Davisf 
749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1938); Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
App. 1988); Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988); Jackman 
v. Jackman. 696 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985). 
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As was clearly stated in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 
1974).: 
Although it is both the duty and prerogative 
of this court in a case of equity to review the 
facts as well as the law, Article 8, Section 
9, Constitution of Utah, the trial judge has 
considerable latitude of discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interests 
in a divorce case. The actions of the trial-
court are indulged with the presumption of 
validity, and the burden is on appellant to 
provide such a serious inequity as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion [footnote]. 
Mrs. Brown's burden is not an easy one and the record does not show 
any inequity which would constitute an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. As was stated in Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 
P.2d 190 (1967): 
It would lead to intolerable instability of 
judgments if this court should assume the 
prerogative and accept the responsibility of 
merely second guessing a trial judge who has 
done a conscientious job of attempting to make 
just and equitable allocation of the property 
and income of the parties in regard to alimony 
and support monies as the trial judge appears 
to have done here. It is due to this fact, 
taking into consideration the nature of the 
trial judge's authority and duty, and his 
advantaged position, that in such matters he 
is allowed a comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion which will not be disturbed in the 
absence of clear abuse . . . 
Id. at 151. 
In this case, not only did the trial court act well within the 
judicial discretion afforded it by the appellate courts of Utah, 
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but also within the specific statutory discretion afforded it by 
the legislature of Utah. Mrs. Brown relies on Section 3 0-3-10.6(2) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
In April of 1987, the Utah Legislature passed Section 30-3-
10.6 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which states in pertinent 
part as follows: 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order -
Judgment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or 
spousal support under any child support order, 
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on 
and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same 
attributes and effect of any judgment 
of a district court, except as 
provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full 
faith and credit in this and in any 
other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive 
modification by this or any other 
jurisdiction, except as provided in 
Subsection 2. i 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under 
a child support order may be modified with 
respect to any period during which a petition 
for modification is pending, but only from the 
date notice of that petition was given to the 
obligee, if the obligor is the petition, or to 
the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
Id. (Emphasis added) 
The critical language of this statute applicable to this case 
is found in subsection (2) set forth below: 
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(2) A child or spousal support payment under 
a child support order may be modified with 
respect to any period during which a petition 
for modification is pending. 
Id. (Emphasis added) 
Inclusion of the word "may" in this statute as opposed to the 
word "shall" clearly demonstrates the intent of our legislature to 
allow the trial court the flexibility to fashion an overall remedy 
which is fair to both parties and which may or may not include 
retroactive application. Such an approach is likewise consistent 
with the longstanding discretionary authority granted to trial 
courts by the appellate courts an domestic relations cases. 
Furthermore, appellant's Brief at page 11 points out that the 
statute is new and, indeed did not become effective until January 
19, 1988. Even if this Court finds that Mrs. Brown's award should 
have been retroactive, law and equity would require it only relate 
back to the day the law became effective May 1987. 
Furthermore, she states "it should be, and is, the policy of 
the court to give retroactive relief" (Appellant's Brief at p. 12.) 
The broad statement is made, however, without any authority from 
Utah or any other jurisdiction. To the contrary, the correct 
principle of domestic relations law is that a trial court is 
afforded a wide latitude of discretion in fashioning remedies to 
meet the needs of the parties in a divorce action. Davis v. Davis, 
749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988). 
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In the instant case, after a complete trial and the receipt 
of 27 exhibits, the trial judge properly weighed all of the factors 
related to both parties and fashioned a remedy that would be as 
fair as possible to both parties under the individual 
circumstances. It included, among many other things, a refusal to 
make retroactive the increased child support award and a decision 
to continue Dr. Brown's alimony obligation until the youngest child 
reached majority. Because Mrs. Brown is dissatisfied with only one 
aspect of the trial court's decision, she has now requested this 
Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on 
that single issue. That request is clearly an invasion of the 
trial court's function as the fact finder and fashioner of 
equitable remedies. 
It also sanctions an approach which, if adopted, would result 
in the overall disposition of a domestic relations case on a 
"piecemeal basis" thereby upsetting and unfairly adjusting an 
overall remedy fashioned by the trial court on an issue by issue 
basis. Common sense and reason tell us that all of the issues in 
a divorce action are interrelated and once a finalt fair resolution 
of those issues has been reached by the trial court, adjusting or 
tampering with one, necessarily causes inequities with others. 
That is what Mrs. Brown is now requesting this Court to do. 
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Succinctly put, the basic flaw in Mrs. Brown's approach is 
that she has not shown that there has been any misapplication of 
the law or any abuse of discretion which would justify a reversal 
of Judge Sawaya's decision on the issue of retroactive application. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT SUPPORTS THE OVERALL REMEDY 
FASHIONED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ORDER 
TO REACH A RESOLUTION FAIR TO BOTH 
PARTIES. 
Mrs. Brown's brief attempts to set forth a detailed summary 
of the testimony presented at trial. However, it does not include 
all of the evidence presented to Judge Sawaya by both sides. Dr. 
Brown would be the first to agree that this litigation has gone on 
much too long, but he definitely disagrees that he is responsible 
for such delay or should bear any alleged cost through a 
retroactive award of increased child support. 
To the contrary, the record reflects that Mrs. Brown was the 
cause of the delay she now blames on Dr. Brown and the judicial 
system. The issues raised in the parties' respective petitions 
for modification were settled by an agreement in June of 1984 two 
months be-fore the August trial. Consequently, that trial date was 
stricken from the calendar. The terms of the June 1984 settlement 
agreement were to increase child support to $500.00 per month, per 
child and with alimony to continue for only two years at $900 per 
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month. Five months after that agreement was reached, Mrs. Brown, 
after receiving without objection to five months' worth of the 
increased child support, backed out. In February 1985, Dr. Brown 
sought to enforce the Settlement Agreement (R. 156). The Domestic 
Commissioner's Recommendation that the June 4, 1984, settlement be 
enforced was rejected by Mrs. Brown (R. 187). The matter was then 
presented to Judge Sawaya on April 15, 1985. He found the 
agreement was openly and fairly negotiated, all issues considered 
and, therefore, was binding on the parties (R. 191-2 07). In May 
of 1985, Mrs. Brown then appealed Judge Sawaya's decision (R. 217) 
to this Court and an opinion was issued in October of 1987, 
reversing Judge Sawaya and remanding the matter back to the trial 
court for trial. The parties then conducted additional discovery 
and a full trial on the merits was held on October 19, 1988. Judge 
Sawaya's decision was once again not to Mrs. Brown's satisfaction 
and she has now appealed to this court a second time but only as 
to one issue — retroactive application. 
The chain of events makes clear that it is Mrs. Brown own 
behavior and inability to accept any court's decision that has 
prolonged this litigation, not any acts by Dr. Brown, nor failures 
of the judicial system. 
It is important to note that Mrs. Brown's avoidance of the 
original June 5, 1984, Settlement Agreement cost Dr. Brown an 
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August 1984 trial date. At this trial, he was seeking to terminate 
his alimony obligation entirely. What ultimately happened, 
however, is Mrs. Brown's alimony continued for four and one-half 
more years until Dr. Brown could be heard at the October 1988 
trial. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Brown argues that Judge Sawaya's decision 
denying retroactive affect to her increased child support is 
intended to "teach her a lesson . . . [that] it will not be 
beneficial to appeal his decisions." (Appellant's Brief at 21.) 
The facts of this case simply do not bear this out. Mrs. Brown is 
actually better off as a result of this second trial than she was 
under Judge Sawaya's original ruling upholding the June 1984 
Settlement Agreement. Under the Stipulation, Mrs. Brown's alimony 
would have terminated in two years (1986). Judge Sawaya's latest 
ruling, however, not only allowed Mrs. Brown's alimony for two 
years after the date of the Stipulation and until the time of the 
1988 trial, but also ten years beyond the date of trial. Clearly, 
she received far more generous treatment as a result of the 1988 
trial rather than the "punishment" she claims she received by Judge 
Sawaya. 
Mrs. Brown further alleges that Judge Sawaya's award of 
$500.00 per child in child support, was an arbitrary increase 
unsupported by any evidence presented at trial. That is not so. 
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In view of the Court's findings of a 40% increase in Dr. Brown's 
income, the increase in support from $300.00 to $500.00 is a 
reasonable award. Dr. Brown testified that he felt the $500.00 per 
month per child figure was reasonable (Tr. 151) and Mrs. Brown must 
be of the same opinion in that she has not claimesd that the trial 
court abused its discretion in increasing the child support to the 
level it did. 
Mrs. Brown spends a great deal of time in her Brief comparing 
and contrasting how Dr. Brown and Mrs. Brown's lifestyles have 
changed in the nine years since their divorce. Although this 
unfortunately may be the case, it is more important to note the 
faithfulness with which Dr. Brown has- fulfilled all monetary 
commitments to his ex-wife and children. He paid every amount he 
has been ordered to pay and much more for his children's benefit. 
He has paid Mrs. Brown 100% of his daughter Charisse's child 
support for the eight months while she was living at his home. For 
three more months, pursuant to a stipulation, he continued to pay 
Mrs. Brown one-half of his support obligations for Charisse even 
though she continued to live with him. 
Simply put, the thrust of Mrs. Brown's Brief is that Dr. Brown 
should pay her an additional $3 3,600, plus interest because Dr. 
Brown makes more money than she does and she feels Dr. Brown can 
afford to pay it. A careful reading of her Brief shows that it is 
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not a presentation of legal arguments in support of the issue 
attempted to be raised, but rather an emotional request that a 
substantial lump sum cash award be given to Mrs. Brown. 
Mrs. Brown has not appealed the adequacy of the child support 
award, but only the question of retroactive application of the 
increase. In so doing, it also becomes clear that she is simply 
indirectly seeking the additional increase in child support she did 
not receive directly from the trial court. 
A simple increase in salary on the part of the non-custodial 
parent is not a sufficient basis in and of itself to automatically 
increase a child support obligation nor to justify a retroactive 
application of any increase in support that might be made. 
Our Supreme Court has held in the case of Owen v. Owen, 579 
P.2d 912, (Utah 1978), when reviewing a modification of support, 
that; 
The issue for the court adjudicate was the 
needs of the children and not necessarily the 
manner and standard of living desired by the 
plaintiff. 
While an increase of the defendant's income is 
certainly an important factor to consider, this 
proposition is also true, the fact that a man 
may so use his abilities as to increase his 
income should not necessarily impose a penalty 
upon him by automatically increasing his 
obligation under a divorce decree. 
Id at 913. 
In this case, the trial court considered evidence on the needs 
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of the children; the earnings of each of the parties; the abilities 
of each party to earn; and the increases in income of both parties 
since the original Decree; Dr. Brown's request to terminate alimony 
in its entirety; Mrs. Brown's needs; Mrs. Brown's request for 
increased child support; her request for retroactive application 
of any increased award; the fact that child support would continue 
for each child until age 21 if each child was enrolled in school; 
and Mrs. Brown's request for attorney's fees. 
After considering all of that evidence, the trial court 
fashioned a remedy which it felt was fair to both parties. As was 
stated in Point II of this Brief, it is the trial court that has 
all of the evidence presented to it listens to the parties, 
observes their demeanor and then shapes a resolution that is not 
a windfall to either but fair to both. That is what the trial 
court did in this case in connection with refusing to make the 
child support award retroactive and that decision should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Brown claims error with the Findings, but she prepared 
them and did not request any alteration of them. She also claims 
the trial court should have retroactively increased child support 
based on a statute passed four years after her petition was filed. 
This statute affords the trial court the right to increase support 
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retroactively but by no means mandates it. 
In this case, Mrs. Brown's sole issue on appeal is whether or 
not the trial court erred in not ordering the increased child 
support award to be retroactive to the date the petition was filed, 
to wit: February 1983 (the statute didn't even become law until 
May, 1987). Mrs. Brown urged retroactive application to the trial 
court and based upon the broad discretion afforded it both under 
case law and the specific discretion set forth in the statute, 
decided it would be inappropriate to grant her request considering 
all of the evidence that had been presented. Therefore, Mrs. Brown 
has no basis to claim error by the trial court. The entire tenor 
of Mrs. Brown's Brief is but a plea for sympathy not based on the 
law or logic. The trial court's decision should be affirmed in all 
respects and Dr. Brown should be awarded his costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of September, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON 
/KENT M. KAS-J 
At torneys f o r Defendan^Jfespondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF fS PETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION AND ON 
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERPETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION 
Civil No. D79-3802 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
THE MATTER of plaintiff's and defendant's petition and 
counter-petition for modification of the decree of divorce came 
on for trial before the Honorable James S. Sawaya on October 
18th, 1988 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff appeared personally and through her attorney of 
record, David A. McPhie. Defendant appeared personally and 
through his attorney of record, Bert L. Dart. 
The matters of the petition and counter-petition were 
fully presented, including evidence and argument. The court's 
decision was taken under advisement. 
Having fully considered the pleadings, exhibits, 
authorities and memorandums of the parties, the court now 
publishes the following as its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court finds that there has been a material change of 
circumstances since the entry of the decree of divorce in this 
matter. The court finds that those changes are twofold, in that 
the plaintiff is now employed and earning approximately 
$14,000.00 annually; whereas, at the time of the decree, she was 
unemployed, having no income. Further, that the defendant has 
income potential exceeding $100,000.00 annually; whereas, his 
income potential at the time of the decree was approximately 
$70,000.00 per year. 
Based upon the foregoing finding of a change of 
circumstances, the court makes the following order on said 
petitions: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The alimony previously ordered in the decree of 
divorce, in the sum of $900.00 per month, shall continue at that 
rate. Further, that said alimony shall terminate at the time the 
youngest child of the parties attains the age of majority. 
2. The child support obligation of the defendant to the 
plaintiff is hereby increased from the sum of $300.00 per month, 
per child, to the sum of $500.00 per month, per child. It is 
further ordered that the child support paid for the oldest child 
of the parties, Cherise, who is now age 18, shall be paid 
directly to her, since she has attained the age of majority. The 
court further orders that the child support for any child 
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attaining the age of majority be paid directly to that child, 
pursuant to the provisions of the original decree, providing for 
continued support to any child of the parties to age 21 years, if 
that child elects to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or 
elects to attend a college or university. 
3. The plaintiff's request that her petition for 
modification be granted retroactive to the date of filing of that 
petition is denied. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees in the sum 
of $5,000.00, which the court determines to be reasonable under 
the facts and circumstances of the proceedings, together with the 
costs reasonably incurred in processing and proceeding with her 
petition. 
5. The defendant's counter-petition, seeking increased 
visitation with the parties children, is granted to allow the 
defendant a period of six weeks during the summer months. The 
visitation of the defendant with the minor children, however, 
shall be based otherwise on the same terms and conditions as in 
the original decree of divorce. 
3 
BROWN v. 
Cite as 744 P26 333 
tionality for the Board to conclude: (1) that 
Robinson's mental illness was not suffi-
ciently within his control; and (2) that any 
exacerbation of his mental problems from 
his use of marijuana did not rise to the 
level of fault essential to establish just 
cause and deny him unemployment bene-
fits. 
We affirm the decision of the Board of 
Review. In doing so, we reiterate that, 
although Champlin may have had reason to 
remove Robinson from his unsupervised op-
erator position because of his mental prob-
lems, "not every cause for discharge pro-
vides a basis to deny eligibility for unem-
ployment compensation." Clearfield City 
v. Department of Employment Sec, 663 
P.2d 440, 441 (Utah 1983). Accord Board 
of Educ. of Sevier County v. Board of 
Review, 701 P.2d at 1068. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ„ concur. 
I UV NUM8£RSYST£M> 
Carol Ann Barker BROWN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Bryant Jerome BROWN, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 860125-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 21, 1987. 
Ex-wife appealed from order of the 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S 
Sawaya, J., enforcing agreement modifying 
decree of divorce. The Court of Appeals, 
Davidson, J., held that putative stipulation 
did not meet requirements for valid binding 
agreement. 
Reversed. 
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
BROWN Utah 333 
(UtahApp. 1987) 
Divorce <^236, 297 
Putative stipulation providing for re-
duced alimony and increased child support, 
that was neither signed by ex-wife nor read 
into record before judge, did not meet re-
quirements for valid binding agreement; 
neither ex-wife's failure to object to agree-
ment nor her acceptance of increased child 
support payments constituted assent to 
agreement so as to estop her from chal-
lenging its validity. U.C.A.1953, 25-5-4; 
District and Circuit Courts Practice Rule 
4.5(b). 
David A. McPhie, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
B.L. Dart, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD 
and ORME, J J. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from an order relative 
to the modification of a decree of divorce 
which treated a putative stipulation as dis-
positive of all issues. We reverse and re-
mand. 
The parties were married on June 4, 
1969. Three children were born to the 
Browns; all of whom are still minors at the 
time of this appeal. Defendant is a physi-
cian with a practice located in Salt Lake 
City. Plaintiff possesses a bachelor's de-
gree and was not employed at the time of 
divorce. The amended decree of divorce 
was signed on February 21, 1980. The 
salient provisions were: plaintiff would 
have custody of the children subject to 
specified visitation rights; defendant would 
pay child support in the amount of $300.00 
per child per month for a total of $900.00 
per month; defendant would pay $900.00 
per month as alimony which would cease if 
plaintiff remarried or cohabited with a 
male; and plaintiff would not be able to 
seek an increase in support or alimony for 
36 months after the date of the decree. 
On March 1, 1983, plaintiff filed a peti-
tion for modification of the decree of di-
vorce which was based on a significant 
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increase in defendant's gross income and a 
material change in plaintiffs circumstanc-
es. The two most important requests for 
modification were for increases in alimony 
and child support to $1,500.00 per month 
and $500.00 per child per month, respective-
ly. -Defendant counterpetitioned for termi-
nation of alimony and for expanded visita-
tion rights. 
During the next fifteen months discovery 
and settlement negotiations took place. 
Plaintiffs deposition was scheduled for 
June 5, 1984, in preparation for a trial set 
for August 14, 1984. Apparently plain-
tiffs counsel caused opposing counsel to 
believe that the issues had been resolved 
satisfactorily and that the time scheduled 
for the taking of plaintiffs deposition could 
be used to record the agreement. The par-
ties and their respective counsel met on the 
scheduled date and recorded the agreement 
at issue before a certified shorthand report-
er. In addition to visitation arrangements, 
the agreement provided that, commencing 
July 1984, alimony would be reduced from 
$900.00 per month to $500.00 per month 
and would continue for two years at the 
lower level before terminating. Child sup-
port was increased from $300.00 per child 
per month to $500.00 per child per month 
with conditions specified when such sup-
port would also terminate. The record indi-
cates that both counsel and defendant 
spoke but that plaintiff said nothing during 
the proceedings. The agreement was sub-
sequently reduced to writing and sent to 
plaintiffs counsel. Beginning in July 1984, 
defendant began paying the total amount 
set forth in the agreement, which payments 
were accepted by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that she was not given 
a copy of the written agreement until Au-
gust 2984. She immediately attempted to 
consult with her counsel but was unable to 
see him until late in September. At that 
meeting, plaintiff stated that she believed 
the agreement to be unfair and refused to 
sign it. Her counsel withdrew on Novem-
ber 7, 1984. 
On February 14, 1985, defendant filed a 
motion for an order approving and enforc-
ing the settlement agreement. On Febru-
ary 25, 1935, plaintiff filed an affidavit 
which stated that her former counsel had 
assured her that increases in alimony and 
child support were justified and that he 
was confident she would win major increas-
es in both; that she was unaware of the 
tenor of the proposed settlement agree-
ment until the day scheduled for her depo-
sition; that her former counsel informed 
her that he told opposing counsel that she 
would agree to the settlement; that she 
was "shocked, dismayed, dissapointed [sic], 
and confused" by her counsel's change in 
position; that she didn't recall speaking at 
the proceeding; and that she refused to 
sign the written agreement. A hearing on 
defendant's motion was held before the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner in March 
1985, who recommended that the motion be 
granted. Plaintiff rejected the recommen-
dation and the motion was argued in Third 
District Court in April. The order enforc-
ing the agreement was filed on May 1, 
1985, and plaintiff timely filed her notice of 
appeal. The issue is whether or not the 
trial court should have accepted and en-
forced the proceedings of June 5, 1984, as a 
stipulation between the parties. 
It is necessary to begin by looking at 
what constitutes a "stipulation". 
A promise or agreement with reference 
to a pending judicial proceeding, made by 
a party to the proceeding or his attorney, 
is binding without consideration. By 
statute or rule of court such an agree-
ment is generally binding only (a) if it is 
in writing and signed by the party or 
attorney, or (b) if it is made or admitted 
in the presence of the court, or (c) to the 
extent that justice requires enforcement 
in view of material change of position in 
reliance on the promise or agreement. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94 
(1981). 
Further, 
It has been said that unless it is clear 
from the record that the parties assent-
ed, there is no stipulation, and it is pro-
vided in many jurisdictions, by rule of 
court or by statute, that a private agree-
ment or consent between the parties or 
their attorneys, in respect to the proceed-
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ings in a cause, will not be enforced by reporter. Had 
the court unless it is evidenced by a 
writing subscribed by the party against 
whom it is alleged or made, and filed by 
the clerk or entered upon the minutes of 
the court. Any other rule would require 
the court to pass upon the credibility of 
the attorneys. 
73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 2 (1974) 
(footnote omitted). 
Utah R.Prac.D. & C.Ct. 4.5(b) requires 
that "[n]o orders, judgments or decrees 
upon stipulation shall be signed or entered 
unless such stipulation is in writing, signed 
by the attorneys of record for the respec-
tive parties and filed with the clerk, provid-
ed that the stipulation may be made orally 
in open court." There can be little doubt 
the rule of practice is concerned with the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds as 
expressed in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 
(1984)f which states that certain agree-
ments are void unless in writing and sub-
scribed by the party to be charged there-
with. The Statute of Frauds was not inter-
posed as an affirmative defense below.2 
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting 
of the minds of those involved. The parties 
must have completed their negotiations ei-
ther in person or through their attorneys 
acting within the rules of agency. The 
agreement then is reduced to writing, 
signed and filed with the clerk or read into 
the record before the court This proce-
dure would indicate obvious assent to the 
provisions of the agreement so stipulated. 
Not so here. 
This agreement was reached between 
one of the parties and both counsel. Mrs. 
Brown remained silent while it was dis-
cussed and read into the record. The pro-
ceeding was not done in court as would be 
permitted by Rule 4.5(b) but was done at 
the time of a deposition before a shorthand 
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it been done in court a 
judge would have been involved and would 
have made inquiry of the parties, likely 
while they were both under oath, if they 
understood and agreed with the terms. 
Had Mrs. Brown remained silent in that 
scenario it is hard to imagine the court 
finding agreement. The same conclusion is 
compelled here. Silence cannot be con-
strued to be assent in these circumstances. 
For a stipulation to be binding, agreement 
by the parties must be evidenced by a 
signed writing which would satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds, or the agreement must 
be stated in court on the record before a 
judge. The facts in this case do not show 
such evidence. Therefore, there was no 
stipulation reached between the parties and 
there is nothing for the court to enforce. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff made no 
timely objection to the agreement and ac-
cepted the additional $200.00 per month 
from him; thus she should be estopped 
from denying its validity. It is easily un-
derstood why plaintiff accepted the in-
creased payments. She was confused as to 
her position, unsure of what her counsel 
might do next, and the payments appear to 
have been her sole means of support Any 
refusal to accept might have resulted in a 
delay or cessation of support or increased 
delays in determining the status of defend-
ant's obligations. We have already dis-
cussed the time delays plaintiff experienced 
in obtaining an appointment with her coun-
sel after she first read the written agree-
ment These facts are insufficient to im-
pute a timeliness issue in accordance with 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 
1975). Neither do these facts give rise to 
estoppel. We will not go around the Stat-
ute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to create a 
stipulation on the mere acceptance of 
1» § 25-5-4: Certain agreements void unless writ-
ten and subscribed. In the following cases ev-
ery agreement shall be void unless such agree-
ment, or some note or memorandum thereof, is 
in writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not 
to be performed within one year from the 
making thereof. 
. Certainly a stipulation setting terms for pay-
ment of alimony and child support would fall 
within the Statute of Frauds since such an 
agreement would not be performed within one 
year from the making. The putative stipulation 
here would run for many years with changes to 
occur at stated intervals. 
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$200.00 per month by plaintiff.3 Whether 
she is entitled to retain the extra payments 
or will be required to credit defendant shall 
be determined by the trial court on remand. 
In summary, we hold that the putative 
stipulation of June 5, 1984, fails to meet 
the requirements of a valid stipulation as 
stated above. The order enforcing the 
agreement is reversed and the case is re-
manded to the trial court for further action 
on plaintiffs original petition for modifica-
tion. Costs against defendant. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge: (dissenting) 
I think what is said in the main opinion 
about the requirements for a binding stipu-
lation is correct. I agree the requirements 
for a valid stipulation were not met in this 
case. However, there are situations where 
a settlement agreement is reached—where 
all parties have had a meeting of the minds 
as to the basis for settlement of an action 
or proceeding—through a device other than 
a stipulation. That agreement might be 
memorialized by an exchange of letters, 
dictation to a shorthand reporter, or even 
just a handshake. In my view, such agree-
ments, intended to be binding when made, 
are enforceable and should be enforced. 
They should be enforced even though one 
party might have a change of heart or 
otherwise balk at signing a formal stipula-
tion designed to implement the valid and 
binding agreement previously made. Par-
ties have no right to welch on a settlement 
deal during the sometimes substantial peri-
od between when the deal is struck and 
when all necessary signatures can be gar-
nered on a stipulation. 
The key in this case, then, is whether 
appellant assented to the settlement agree-
ment which was dictated to the reporter in 
her presence. She concededly sat mute 
throughout the proceeding. Her duly em-
ployed attorney, however, manifested as-
sent on her behalf. The pivotal issue is 
whether he had authority to do so. 
3. The evidence shows this defendant to be earn-
ing a substantial income. The additional 
$200.00 per month paid on this putative stipula-
The facts are in conflict on this point. 
Appellant suggests she was stupefied by 
her former attorney's betrayal and ren-
dered unable to speak or, apparently, even 
to storm out. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to infer, as those present did, 
that a principal who says nothing when her 
agent speaks for her is in accord with the 
sentiments expressed by the agent. This 
inference is bolstered by evidence which is 
usually quite reliable—the subsequent 
course of conduct of the parties. Follow-
ing the apparent agreement, respondent 
made payment at the higher level contem-
plated by the putative settlement and for 
several months appellant accepted those 
payments without incident. No unfavora-
ble inference would be available from her 
merely cashing the checks, which were 
mostly for amounts clearly due her. But 
her retention and use of the extra amount 
not due her under the original decree is 
consistent only with an understanding that 
a settlement had been reached—or, I sup-
pose, of dishonesty on her part. Layper-
sons fully understand that they may spend 
money only if it is theirs. There being 
nothing to suggest appellant was dishon-
est, the fact that she kept the extra amount 
rather than returning it tends to show she 
thought it was hers to keep; it could be 
hers to keep only if the decree were mod-
ified, as per the settlement, to increase the 
monthly total due for her support and that 
of the children. Thus, her retention and 
use of the larger payments tendered subse-
quent to the alleged settlement tends to 
show she had agreed to the terms of the 
settlement. 
The facts concerning whether appellant 
assented to the settlement would support a 
conclusion either way. After hearing the 
motion to enforce the settlement, which a 
commissioner earlier heard and recom-
mended be granted, the trial court made 
findings of fact to the effect that appellant 
was bound by the settlement I concede, 
however, that those findings are not enti-
tled to the usual deference because the 
court did not receive actual testimony. Cf. 
tion represents no hardship and no material 
change of circumstances on his part. 
Diversified Equities, Inc. 
Savings & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133,1136 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987).1 The court received affida-
vits and counsels' representations about 
what the testimony would show. Thus, the 
trial court's usual advantage in terms of 
viewing the witnesses and their demeanor 
does not obtain in this case. We are in as 
good a position to review the affidavits and 
consider the proffer2 as was the trial 
court.3 After considering these items, I 
agree with the commissioner and the trial 
judge that the facts more readily support 
the conclusion that appellant initially 
agreed to the settlement and then had a 
change of heart than the conclusion that 
she never agreed but was rendered unable 
to say so and simply regarded the extra 
amounts tendered as a coincidental gift 
from her ex-husband. 
I would affirm. 
MARTIN v. MOTT 
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Myrna I. MARTIN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard G. MOTT, et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 860103-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 22, 1987. 
Patient brought medical malpractice 
action against podiatrist in which she al-
leged that podiatrist failed to properly di-
agnose and treat her condition. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Philip R. 
Fishier, J., granted podiatrist's motion for 
summary judgment and patient appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that 
medical doctor who was acting as expert 
for patient was unfamiliar with standard of 
care applicable to podiatrist, and thus was 
not competent to testify as to any breach of 
such standard; thus, summary judgment 
was appropriate. 
Affirmed. 
1. In Diversified Equities, the trial court received 
an extensive recitation of facts to which the 
parties had stipulated. 739 P.2d at 1134. The 
trial court then entered "findings" of fact. We 
observed: "Generally, a trial court's findings of 
fact are accorded great deference. However, 
without regard to the labels used, when those 
"findings" proceed from stipulated facts . . . the 
"findings" are tantamount to conclusions of law, 
with the stipulation of facts being the functional 
equivalent of the findings of fact." 739 P.2d at 
1136. That conclusion is premised on two 
factors: First, a disposition based on stipulated 
facts is "not one involving resolution by the trial 
court of conflicting testimony." Schroeder v. 
Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1979) (en 
banc). Second, since the facts are written or 
recited and do not turn on witness credibility, 
an appellate court has "the same means as the 
trial court had of reaching a correct conclusion 
of law " Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 
(Ala. 1980). Those same factors apply to the 
affidavits and proffer which substituted for tes-
timony in the instant case. Although the con-
flict between the affidavits should have prompt-
ed an evidentiary hearing, see Note 3, infra, we 
1. Physicians and Surgeons <3=>18.80(7, 8) 
In medical malpractice action, unless 
within common knowledge and experience 
are in as good a position as was the trial court 
to read the affidavits and the proffer and draw 
logical conclusions therefrom. 
2. Fortunately, one of the two attorneys request-
ed that the hearing be reported or the proffer 
would be unavailable to us. Such a hearing 
should be reported as a matter of course. See 
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. 
App.1987) ("Although consistently making a 
record of all proceedings imposes a greater bur-
den on the trial court and court reporters, it is 
impossible for an appellate court to review what 
may ultimately prove to be important proceed-
ings when no record of them has been made."). 
3. In retrospect, an evidentiary hearing would 
probably have been preferable. Had the testi-
mony been consistent with the affidavits and 
proffer and the same findings made, those find-
ings would clearly be entitled to the usual defer-
ence and the trial court's disposition would 
clearly be entitled to affirmance. However, nei-
ther side requested an evidentiary hearing and 
appellant does not argue on appeal that she was 
entitled to one. 
